We model a potentially mutualistic interaction between a species making antipredator alarm calls and a species which eavesdrops on those calls. Callers may or may not make deceptive alarm calls in order to kleptoparasitize food from eavesdroppers, which in turn may either heed or ignore all alarm calls. The two most likely outcomes in our model are either maximally deceptive callers and maximally trusting eavesdroppers, or persistently cycling strategy frequencies. The latter is favoured by low predator density, low density of any alternative honest alarm-calling species, ability of eavesdroppers to preferentially heed calls when costs of doing so are low and, in some cases, low food availability.
Introduction
Many species make alarm calls warning conspecifics of the presence of predators. Often, heterospecific eavesdroppers also heed these calls. Some callers take advantage of this by making false calls, which distract or frighten eavesdroppers and provide callers opportunities to steal food items (kleptoparasitism) [1 -3] .
In the narrow context of a single false alarm call, this is clearly a negative interaction for the eavesdropper. Why then does selection not push eavesdroppers to ignore these calls? If eavesdroppers cannot distinguish between honest and false calls, and achieve higher fitness by heeding all calls than they would by ignoring all calls, this type of kleptoparasitism may be viewed as the cost of a wider mutualistic interaction ( prior work on these [1, 2] and related [4] interactions has made similar arguments). Callers making a higher frequency of false calls would then represent more exploitative partners, and callers making a higher frequency of honest calls would represent more generous partners. Similarly, eavesdroppers which respond to calls more often would represent more generous partners than those which frequently ignore calls.
It then becomes interesting to ask which ecological factors favour generosity on each side of this interaction (preventing breakdown of the mutualism), and how various factors affect the relative fitnesses of exploitative versus generous partners or the potential for coexistence of multiple strategies within a guild. Ecological conditions may dramatically affect evolutionary dynamics in intraspecific kleptoparasitism models [5] [6] [7] . Eavesdropper group size [8] , food item or eavesdropper size [9] , temperature or time of day [10] and whether callers are feeding young [1] have each been shown to affect deceptive call frequency and/or eavesdropper responses to kleptoparasites, and kleptoparasitic sentinels can affect many aspects of victim foraging behaviour and success [3] .
We explore these questions with a game theoretic model of interactions between two classes of player. 'Callers' make honest alarm calls when predators are present (consistent with an intraspecific benefit of honest calls), but may also use deceptive calls to attempt to kleptoparasitize 'eavesdroppers'. Eavesdroppers may heed or ignore calls.
Models and results
See table 1 for parameter definitions. In our model, callers may be 'honest' or 'deceptive'; eavesdroppers may be 'trusters' or 'ignorers'. We do not consider mixed strategies (e.g. trusting with some intermediate probability), but such strategies cannot be evolutionary stable in this type of game [11] . We assume discrete-time replicator dynamics, such that strategies' relative frequencies change according to
and
We assume that all callers obtain equal background fitness, G A0 , which is independent of their interactions with eavesdroppers. False alarm calls are made only when deceptive callers encounter an eavesdropper with a food item and no predator is present, consistent with callers being unable to safely recover food items with predators present (i.e. items abandoned in response to honest calls have no value). We assume that kleptoparasitism attempts are always costly (e.g. owing to opportunity costs incurred while calling and observing eavesdroppers' responses), but only successful with trusting eavesdroppers. The expected pay-off to a deceptive caller per iteration of the game is then
(2:3)
Under these assumptions, eavesdroppers do not affect honest callers, whose expected pay-offs are
Eavesdroppers encounter alarm calls whenever any caller (of either type) and a predator are both present, or when a deceptive caller is present and the eavesdropper has a food item (for the deceptive caller to attempt to steal) in the absence of any predator. When trusting eavesdroppers hear a call, they run and hide. The benefit of doing so is reduced risk of attack by any predator that might be present. The costs are abandoning any food item the eavesdropper may have, and opportunity costs incurred while hiding. Expected pay-offs to trusters are
Ignorer eavesdroppers never respond to calls, and their expected pay-offs are
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) require non-negative fitnesses ( pay-offs). Thus, we assume that 
frequency of honest callers F T frequency of trusting eavesdroppers Q f probability of an eavesdropper having a food item (increases with food availability) M opportunity costs of hiding in response to an alarm call (likely increases with food availability at low Q f , decreases with food availability at high Q f ) v expected predation-avoidance benefit to an eavesdropper of heeding an alarm call when a predator is present Q V probability of a predator being present (increases with predator density) s value of a stolen food item to a caller c cost of a kleptoparasitism attempt (i.e. a false call) to a caller W probability of an eavesdropper encountering an alarm caller of an alternative (honest) species (increases with alt. caller density) Q N probability that an ignorer eavesdropper heeds an alarm call when empty-handed rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org Biol. Lett. 10: 20140073
The model's behaviour depends on whether an interior equilibrium point (0 , F
Honest callers have higher fitness than deceptive callers when F T , F Ã T , and lower fitness when F T . F Ã T (figure 1). When c . s (the cost of stealing a food item exceeds its value), F Ã T . 1, false calls are never profitable and deceptive callers are excluded (i.e. outcompeted by honest callers and lost from the system).
Setting 
(the expected predation-related benefit of trusting deceptive callers exceeds the expected cost), F Ã D . 1, heeding calls is always advantageous, and ignorers are excluded (along with honest callers when c , s and deceptive callers when c . s). Thus, a necessary condition for coexistence of alternative strategies (in both guilds) is that
or predators be deadly but rare.
When an interior equilibrium point exists, the model exhibits cycles around that point, which continually expand outward towards the boundaries of the (F D , F T ) state space. Even so, the time-averaged frequencies of trusting eavesdroppers and deceptive callers increase with F Ã T and F Ã D , respectively (figure 2; electronic supplementary material). Thus, trusting eavesdroppers are favoured by a high cost of false calls relative to food items' value to callers, and deceptive callers are favoured by abundant and deadly predators. Food availability may benefit either honest or deceptive callers. F Ã D decreases with food items' value to eavesdroppers, the probability of eavesdroppers having a food item and the opportunity costs hiding eavesdroppers pay. The former two are related in opposite ways to food availability, because a food item in hand should be more valuable when finding the next item requires a longer search time. All else being equal, opportunity costs should be lower when food is abundant (and foragers can satiate themselves in a short time), but should increase with food availability when food is scarce.
We consider two extensions to the model: that emptyhanded ignorers may heed alarm calls (which are then all honest) with some fixed probability Q N , and that the focal caller species may be part of a wider mixed-species assemblage, with other members providing a background level of purely honest alarm calls (indistinguishable by eavesdroppers from those of the focal callers).
These extensions change equations (2.5), (2.6), (2.8) and (2.10) to
11)
12)
and The ever-expanding cycles we observe result from the discrete-time nature of our models: analogous continuous models instead exhibit periodic oscillations (electronic supplementary material). However, the key results upon which we focus (F Ã T , F Ã D and which strategies have higher fitness on either side of them) remain unchanged. In continuous time, multiple events (honest and deceptive calls, predator arrival), and changes in food item value, may occur as foragers handle any given food item. We present discrete models in the main text because they correspond better to the simplified discrete scenarios we describe, which do not consider those possibilities.
Discussion
To explore when and why foragers susceptible to deceptive kleptoparasitic alarm calls might be maintained by selection, we model such calls as part of a wider, potentially mutualistic interaction in which eavesdroppers benefit from honest calls while callers benefit from kleptoparasitism. Breakdown of this mutualism (one or both partners ceasing to benefit the other) is unlikely in our model. It would require selection to consistently favour honest callers (which never benefit from eavesdroppers) and/or ignoring eavesdroppers (which never benefit callers). The former would require that kleptoparasitism never pays off owing to prohibitive costs. When empty-handed ignorers never heed calls (Q N ¼ 0), the latter would require such ineffective predators that eavesdroppers with food items should never heed even honest calls. Two more feasible outcomes are the fixation of deceptive callers and trusting eavesdroppers, or persistently cycling strategy frequencies. The former occurs when the expected benefits of heeding a call outweigh the expected costs even in a community dominated by deceptive callers (whose calls are accurate when predators are present); the latter occurs when costs outweigh benefits in such a community. Low predator density thus promotes cycles.
Food availability has potentially conflicting effects on deceptive callers. As food availability increases, abandoning each food item costs trusters less (in terms of time spent searching for the next item), but trusters pay that cost more frequently. Increasing food availability could increase opportunity costs associated with hiding when food is scarce, but decrease them when food is abundant. If empty-handed ignorers often heed calls, high food availability may benefit deceptive callers by reducing ignorers' chances of evading predation. These effects' relative strengths will depend on eavesdropper and caller functional responses, a topic worth exploring in future models.
Alternative honest caller species benefit deceptive callers by allowing trusting eavesdroppers to persist even when focal callers' net effects are negative. Kleptoparasites have been found to initial F T = 0.6 initial F T = 0.999 rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org Biol. Lett. 10: 20140073 mimic honest callers' species-specific calls [3] , which should enhance this possibility. However, even in such systems eavesdroppers have been found to respond to species-specific calls of the potentially deceptive/kleptoparasitic species [3] , suggesting that heeding those calls may also provide some benefit. It would be interesting to explicitly model the effects of species-specific calls, call-specific eavesdropper responses and mimicry on strategy dynamics. Other interesting extensions of this work would be to explore how feedbacks on the densities and/or behaviours of other community members (food items, predators, or alternative eavesdropper or caller species) might affect these types of interactions.
Our models represent one simple, early exploration of how several ecological factors are likely to affect trait dynamics in this type of mutualism. The models' qualitative predictions make intuitive sense and are much less dependent on our simplifying assumptions than are their particular dynamic behaviours (i.e. ever-expanding cycles). For precise predictions concerning dynamics, more system-specific models with greater biological detail should be developed.
Kleptoparasitic interactions often involve intricate, context-dependent behaviours by one or both participants [1] [2] [3] [4] [8] [9] [10] 12, 13] . Such complexity makes these systems promising potential sources of new perspectives on feedbacks between costs and benefits of mutualistic interactions, populations and communities of mutualistic partners, and the wider communities within which mutualisms are embedded.
